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Abstract
As machine learning black boxes are increasingly being de-
ployed in critical domains such as healthcare and criminal
justice, there has been a growing emphasis on developing
techniques for explaining these black boxes in a human inter-
pretable manner. It has recently become apparent that a high-
fidelity explanation of a black box ML model may not accu-
rately reflect the biases in the black box. As a consequence,
explanations have the potential to mislead human users into
trusting a problematic black box. In this work, we rigorously
explore the notion of misleading explanations and how they
influence user trust in black box models. More specifically,
we propose a novel theoretical framework for understanding
and generating misleading explanations, and carry out a user
study with domain experts to demonstrate how these expla-
nations can be used to mislead users. Our work is the first to
empirically establish how user trust in black box models can
be manipulated via misleading explanations.
1 Introduction
There has been an increasing interest in using ML mod-
els to aid decision makers in domains such as healthcare
and criminal justice. In these domains, it is critical that
decision makers understand and trust ML models, to en-
sure that they can diagnose errors and identify model bi-
ases correctly. However, ML models that achieve state-of-
the-art accuracy are typically complex black boxes that are
hard to understand. As a consequence, there has been a re-
cent surge in post hoc explanation techniques for explain-
ing black box models (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2018;
2016; Lakkaraju et al. 2019; Lundberg and Lee 2017). One
of the goals of such explanations is to help domain experts
detect systematic errors and biases in black box model be-
havior (Doshi-Velez and Kim 2017).
Existing techniques for explaining black boxes typi-
cally rely on optimizing fidelity—i.e., ensuring that the ex-
planations accurately mimic the predictions of black box
model (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016; 2018; Lakkaraju
et al. 2019). The key assumption underlying these ap-
proaches is that if an explanation has high fidelity, then bi-
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ases of the black box model will be reflected in the expla-
nation. However, it is questionable whether this assumption
actually holds in practice (Lipton 2016). The key issue is that
high fidelity only ensures high correlation between the pre-
dictions of the explanation and the predictions of the black
box. There are several other challenges associated with post
hoc explanations which are not captured by the fidelity met-
ric: (i) they may fail to capture causal relationships between
input features and black box predictions (Lipton 2016;
Rudin 2019), (ii) there could be multiple high-fidelity expla-
nations for the same black box that look qualitatively differ-
ent (Lakkaraju et al. 2019), and (iii) they may not be robust
and can vary significantly even with small perturbations to
input data (Ghorbani, Abid, and Zou 2019).
These challenges increase the possibility that explana-
tions generated using existing techniques can actually mis-
lead the decision maker into trusting a problematic black
box. However, there has been little to no prior work empiri-
cally studying if and how explanations can mislead users.
Contributions. We propose the first systematic study to ex-
plore if and how explanations of black boxes can mislead
users. First, we propose a novel theoretical framework for
understanding when misleading explanations can exist. We
show that even if an explanation achieves perfect fidelity,
it may still not reflect issues in the black box model. The
key issue is that due to correlations in the features, explana-
tions can achieve high fidelity even if they use entirely dif-
ferent features compared to the black box. Second, we pro-
pose a novel approach for generating potentially mislead-
ing explanations. Our approach extends the MUSE frame-
work (Lakkaraju et al. 2019) to favor explanations that con-
tain features that users believe are relevant and omit features
that users believe are problematic. Third, we perform an ex-
tensive user study with domain experts from law and crim-
inal justice to understand how misleading explanations im-
pact user trust. Our results demonstrate that the misleading
explanations generated using our approach can in fact in-
crease user trust of by 9.8 times (See Figure 1). Our findings
have far reaching implications both for research on ML in-
terpretability and real-world applications of ML.
Related work. Present work on interpretable ML largely
falls into three categories. First, there are approaches fo-
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If Race ≠ African American:
If Prior-Felony = Yes and Crime-Status = Active, then Risky
If Prior-Convictions = 0, then Not Risky
If Race = African American:
If Pays-rent = No and Gender = Male, then Risky
If Lives-with-Partner = No and College = No, then Risky
If Age ≥35 and Has-Kids = Yes, then Not Risky
If Wages ≥70K, then Not Risky
Default: Not Risky
If  Current-Offense = Felony:
If Prior-FTA = Yes and Prior-Arrests ≥ 1, then Risky
If Crime-Status = Active and Owns-House = No and Has-Kids = No, then Risky
If Prior-Convictions = 0 and College = Yes and Owns-House = Yes, then Not Risky
If Current-Offense = Misdemeanor and Prior-Arrests > 1: 
If Prior-Jail-Incarcerations = Yes, then Risky
If Has-Kids = Yes and Married = Yes and Owns-House = Yes, then Not Risky
If Lives-with-Partner = Yes and College = Yes and Pays-Rent = Yes, then Not Risky
If Current-Offense = Misdemeanor and Prior-Arrests ≤ 1:
If Has-Kids = No and Owns-House = No and Prior-Jail-Incarcerations = Yes, then Risky
If Age ≥ 50 and Has-Kids = Yes and Prior-FTA = No, then Not Risky
Default: Not Risky
Figure 1: Classifier which uses prohibited features (race and gender) when making predictions (left); and its misleading expla-
nation (right) which excludes prohibited features (race, gender) and includes desired features (prior jail incarcerations, prior
FTA1). Our user study shows that domain experts are 9.8 times more likely to trust the classifier if they see the explanation on
the right (instead of the classifier). Presence or absence of race and gender drives user trust (See Section 5.2)
cused on learning predictive models that are human un-
derstandable (Letham et al. 2015; Lakkaraju, Bach, and
Leskovec 2016; Caruana et al. 2015). However, complex
models such as deep neural networks and random forests
typically achieve higher performance compared to inter-
pretable models (Ribeiro, Singh, and Guestrin 2016), so in
many situations it is more desirable to use these complex
models. Thus, there has been work on explaining such com-
plex black boxes. One approach is to provide local expla-
nations for individual predictions of the black box (Ribeiro,
Singh, and Guestrin 2018; 2016; Lundberg and Lee 2017),
which is useful when a decision maker plans to review ev-
ery decision made by the black box. An alternate approach
is to provide a global explanation that describes the black
box as a whole, typically summarizing it using an inter-
pretable model (Lakkaraju et al. 2019; Bastani, Kim, and
Bastani 2017), which is useful in validating the black boxes
before they are deployed to automatically make decisions
(i.e., without human involvement).
There has been some empirical work on studying how hu-
mans understand and trust interpretable models and explana-
tions. For instance, Poursabzi-Sangdeh et. al. (2018) show
that longer explanations are harder for humans to simulate
accurately. There has also been recent work on understand-
ing what makes explanations useful in the context of three
tasks they are likely to perform given an explanation of an
ML system: (i) predicting the system’s output, (ii) verifying
whether the output is consistent with the explanation, and
(iii) determining if and how the output would change if we
change the input (Lage et al. 2019).
More closely related to our work, there has been recent
work on exploring the vulnerabilities of black box expla-
nations. For instance, there has been work demonstrating
that explanations can be unstable, changing drastically even
with small perturbations to inputs (Dombrowski et al. 2019;
Ghorbani, Abid, and Zou 2019). Finally, recent work has
argued that black box explanations can often be mislead-
ing and can potentially lead users to trust problematic black
boxes (Lipton 2016; Ghorbani, Abid, and Zou 2019).
In contrast, we are the first to study if and how adversarial
entities could generate misleading explanations to manipu-
late user trust. We are also the first to explore the notion of
confirmation bias in the context of black box explanations.
2 Problem Formulation
In this section, we introduce some notation and formalize
the notions of (i) explanation of a black box model, and (ii)
misleading explanation of a black box model.
Explanations. Given input data X , a set of class labels Y =
{1, 2, · · ·K}, and a black box B : X → Y , our goal is to
generate an explanation E that describes the behavior of B.
Then, end users can use E to determine whether to trust B.
We consider an approach to explaining B by approximat-
ing it using an interpretable model E ∈ E . We measure the
quality of this approximation using the relative error
L(E,B) = Ep(x)[`(E(x), B(x))]
where p(x) is the data distribution and `(y, y′) is any loss
function—e.g., the 0-1 loss `(y, y′) = I[y 6= y′]. We want
to choose an explanation E ∈ E that minimizes the relative
error. We also define the fidelity of E to be 1− L(E,B).
Trustworthy black boxes & misleading explanations. We
assume a workflow where the human user relies on Eˆ to
decide whether to trust B. We model the human user as an
oracle O : E → {0, 1} such that
O(E) = I[user trusts black box B given explanation E].
We can compute O via a user study that shows users Eˆ and
asks if they trust B. We also assume there is a “correct”
choice of whether B is trustworthy. We model this ground
truth as an oracle O∗ : B → {0, 1}, where B is the space of
all black boxes andO∗(B) = I[B is trustworthy]. An expla-
nation E for B is misleading if O(E) 6= O∗(B).
Constructing misleading explanations. Our goal is to
demonstrate that misleading explanations exist. In our ap-
proach, we first devise a black box B that we expect to be
untrustworthy. This expectation is based on which features
are used by the model (see Section 3). Then, we need to
check if B is actually untrustworthy (i.e., O∗(B) = 0). To
do so, we chooseB to itself be an interpretable model. Then,
we perform a user study where we show B and ask if it is
trustworthy, yielding O∗(B). In this approach, B is still a
black box in the sense that (i) Eˆ is constructed without ex-
amining the internals of B, and (ii) users are not aware of
the internals of B when shown E to evaluate O(E).
Next, we construct an explanation E of B that we ex-
pect to be misleading; again, this expectation is based on
which features are in the explanation (see Section 3). Then,
we check if E is indeed misleading (i.e., evaluateO(E)) via
a user study. Assuming we successfully constructed B so
that O∗(B) = 0, then E is misleading if O(E) = 1. We
discuss how we construct E in Section 4 (B is constructed
similarly), and how we perform the user studies in Section 5.
3 Theoretical Framework
We define notions of a potentially untrustworthy black box
B and a potentially misleading explanation E for B. These
notions are only used to guide our algorithms; once we have
constructed B and E, we test whether B is actually untrust-
worthy andE is actually misleading via user studies. Finally,
we discuss when potentially misleading explanations exist.
Quantifying user trust. We consider a simple approach to
estimating whether a user trustsB givenE. We assume their
key criterion is which features are included in E and which
ones are omitted. More precisely, we assume the feature
space can be decomposed into X = XD ×XA ×XP , where
XD corresponds to the desired features D that the user ex-
pects to be included, XA corresponds to the ambivalent fea-
tures A for which the user is indifferent about whether they
are included, and XP corresponds to the prohibited features
P that the user expects to be omitted.
Next, an acceptable explanation E ∈ E+ ⊆ E is one
where desired features appear in E and the prohibited fea-
tures do not. Then, we estimate that user decisions O(E)
are based on (i) whether E is acceptable, and (ii) whether E
meets a minimum level + ∈ R≥0 of fidelity—i.e., defining
Oˆ(E) = I[E ∈ E+ ∧ L(E,B) ≤ +],
we have estimate Oˆ(E) ≈ O(E). Similarly, for black boxes
that are interpretable, an acceptable blackbox B ∈ B+ ⊆ B
is one where the desired features appear inB and the prohib-
ited features do not. Then, we estimate that user decisions
O∗(B) are based on whether B is acceptable—i.e., letting
Oˆ∗(B) = I[B ∈ B+], we have Oˆ∗(B) ≈ O∗(B). The user
studies we perform demonstrate that Oˆ and Oˆ∗ are good es-
timates of O and O∗, respectively; see Section 5.
Now, we say B is potentially untrustworthy if Oˆ∗(B) =
0, and say E is potentially misleading if Oˆ(E) 6= Oˆ∗(B).
Figure 1 shows a potentially untrustworthy blackbox (left)
and a potentially misleading explanation (right).
Existence of potentially misleading explanations. We
study when potentially misleading explanations exist. First,
even if an explanation has perfect fidelity, it can still be po-
tentially misleading:
Theorem 3.1. There exists a black box B and an expla-
nation E of B such that (i) E has perfect fidelity (i.e.,
L(E,B) = 0), and (ii) E is potentially misleading. [See
Appendix B for proof]
This result is for a specific black box and a specific ex-
planation of that black box. Next, we study more general
settings where potentially misleading explanations exist. Let
E ∈ E be the best explanation for black box B. We focus on
the case where Oˆ∗(B) = 0 (i.e., the black box is potentially
untrustworthy), so E is potentially misleading if Oˆ(E) = 1.
Intuitively, potentially misleading explanations exist when
the prohibited features P can be reconstructed from the re-
maining ones D ∪ A. In this case, a misleading explanation
can internally reconstruct P using the D ∪ A. A potential
concern is that even when P can be reconstructed, it may
not be possible to do so using an interpretable model. We
show that an acceptable interpretable model can reconstruct
P as long as (i) an acceptable black box B+ can reconstruct
P and achieve good accuracy, and (ii) we can explain B+
using an acceptable interpretable model that achieves high
fidelity. Intuitively, we expect (i) to hold when P can be re-
constructed from D ∪A, and we expect (ii) to hold since an
explanation of B+ should not depend on features not in B+.
We formalize (i) and (ii). For (i), let B+ ∈ B+ be the
best acceptable blackbox. The restriction error is R =
L(B+, B). Then, (i) corresponds to R ≈ 0—i.e., P can
be reconstructed from D ∪ A when B+ can then achieve
loss similar to B by internally reconstructing P . For (ii), let
E′ ∈ E be the best explanation for B+, and let E+ ∈ E+
be the best acceptable explanation of B+. The acceptable
relative error is the gap in fidelity between these two—i.e.,
A = L(E
′, B+)− L(E+, B+) ≥ 0.
Then, (ii) corresponds to A ≈ 0—i.e., E+ is almost as
good an explanation of B+ as E′. Intuitively, this assump-
tion should hold since B+ does not use P , so there should
exist a high fidelity explanation of B+ that does not use P .
Finally, suppose that R, A are small, and that there ex-
ists a high fidelity explanation E ∈ E (which may not be
acceptable); then, E+ is potentially misleading:
Theorem 3.2. Suppose O∗(B) = 0; if L(E,B) + 2R +
A ≤ +, then E+ is potentially misleading. [See Ap-
pendix B for proof]
4 Generating Misleading Explanations
Our algorithm for constructing misleading explanations of
black boxes builds on the Model Understanding through
Subspace Explanations (MUSE) framework (Lakkaraju et
al. 2019) by incorporating additional constraints that enable
us to output high fidelity explanations that include desired
features and omit prohibited features.
4.1 Background on MUSE
Given a black box, MUSE produces an explanation in the
form of a two-level decision set, which intuitively is a model
consisting of nested if-then statements where the nesting
depth is two. MUSE chooses an explanation that maximizes
two objectives: (i) interpretability: easier for humans to un-
derstand, and (ii) fidelity: the explanation should mimic the
behavior of the black box.
Two-level decision sets. A two-level decision set R : X →
Y is a hierarchical model consisting of a set of decision sets,
each of which is embedded within an outer if-then struc-
ture. 2 Intuitively, the outer if-then rules can be thought of
2The clauses within each of the two levels are unordered, so
multiple rules may apply to a given example x ∈ X . Ties between
as neighborhood descriptors which correspond to different
parts of the feature space, and the inner if-then rules are pat-
terns of model behaviors within the corresponding neighbor-
hood. Formally, a two-level decision set has form
R = {(q1, s1, c1), · · · , (qM , sM , cM )},
where ci ∈ Y is a label, and qi and si are conjunctions of
predicates of the form “feature ∼ value”, where ∼ ∈ {=,≥
,≤} is an operator; e.g., “age ≥ 50” is a predicate. In par-
ticular, qi corresponds to the neighborhood descriptor, and
(si, ci) together represent the inner if-then rules with si de-
noting the antecedent (i.e., the if condition) and ci denoting
the consequent (i.e., the corresponding label).
Optimization problem. Below, we give an overview of the
objective function of MUSE. The objective of MUSE is es-
timated on a given training datasetD in the context of a two-
level decision set R and a black box B.
First, there are many measures of interpretability—e.g.,
explanations with fewer rules are typically easier to under-
stand. MUSE employs seven such measures. The first four
measures are the number of predicates f1(R), the feature
overlap f2(R), the rule overlap f3(R), and the cover f4(R);
these four measures are part of the optimization objective.
The next three measures are the size g1(R), the maximum
width g2(R), and the number of unique neighborhood de-
scriptors g3(R); these three measures are included as con-
straints in the optimization problem. For details on the defi-
nitions of these measures, see Appendix A.1.
Second, fidelity is measured as before—e.g., the accuracy
relative to B. We use f5(R) to denote the fidelity of R.
Finally, to construct the search space, we use frequent
itemset mining (e.g., apriori (Agrawal and Srikant 2004)) to
generate two sets of potential if conditions (i.e., sets of con-
junctions of predicates): (i) ND from which we can choose
the neighborhood descriptors, and (ii) DL from which we
can choose the inner if-then rules. Then, the complete opti-
mization problem is:
argmax
R⊆ND×DL×C
5∑
i=1
λifi(R) (1)
subj. to gi(R) ≤ i ∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
The hyperparameters λ1, ..., λ5 ∈ R≥0 can be chosen using
cross-validation; 1, 2, 3 must be chosen by the user.
Optimization procedure. The optimization problem (1)
is non-normal, non-negative, non-monotone, and submod-
ular with matroid constraints (Lakkaraju et al. 2019). Ex-
actly solving this problem is NP-Hard (Khuller, Moss, and
Naor 1999). Approximate local search provides the best
known theoretical guarantees for this class of problems—
i.e., (k+2+1/k+δ)−1, where k is the number of constraints
and δ > 0 (Lee et al. 2009).
4.2 Our Approach
We extend MUSE to generate potentially misleading expla-
nations by modifying the optimization problem (1). In par-
ticular, we need to (i) ensure that none of the prohibited
different if-then clauses are broken according to which rules are
most accurate; see (Lakkaraju et al. 2019) for details.
features P (e.g., race) appear in the explanation (even if
they are being used by the black box to make predictions),
and (ii) ensure that all the desired features D appear (even
if they are not being used by the black box). Formally, let
ND+ ⊆ ND denote the set of candidate if conditions for
outer if clauses that do not include any prohibited attributes,
and let DL+ ⊆ DL be the analog for inner if clauses. Fur-
thermore, we also add a term to the objective that measures
the number of features in XD that are part of some rule inR:
coverdesired(R) =
∑
d∈D
I[∃(q, s, c) ∈ R s.t. d ∈ (q ∪ s)],
where d ∈ D is a desired feature. Maximizing this value
will in turn maximize the chance that every desired attribute
appears somewhere in the explanation.
Together, we use the following optimization problem to
construct candidate misleading explanations:
argmax
R⊆ND+×DL+×C
5∑
i=1
λifi(R) + λ6f6(R) (2)
subj. to gi(R) ≤ i (∀i ∈ {1, 2, 3})
where f6(R) = coverdesired(R). The following theorem
shows that as before, we can solve (2) with approximate lo-
cal search:
Theorem 4.1. (2) is non-normal, non-negative, non-
monotone, and submodular, and has matroid constraints.
[See Appendix B for proof]
5 Experimental Evaluation
Our goal is to evaluate how explanations can affect users’
trust of a black box. To this end, we first construct a black
box and its explanations. Then, we perform a user study with
domain experts to understand how each explanation affects
user trust of the black box. All of our experiments are per-
formed in the context of a real world application - bail deci-
sions.
A key aspect of our approach is that the “black box” B
that we construct is itself an interpretable model. This al-
lows us to evaluate whether B is actually untrustworthy
(i.e., O∗(B) = 0) via user studies. 3 Also, for an expla-
nation E of B, we can check if B is trusted given only
on E (i.e., O(E) = 1). If both of these criteria hold i.e.,
O∗(B) 6= O(E), then explanation E is misleading.
Bail decisions. Our experiments focus on bail decision mak-
ing, a high-stakes task. Police arrest over 10 million people
each year in the U.S. (Kleinberg et al. 2017). Soon after ar-
rest, judges decide whether defendants should be released on
bail or must wait in jail until their trial. Since cases can take
several months to proceed to trial, bail decisions are con-
sequential both for defendants as well as society. By law, a
defendant should be released only if the judge believes that
they will not flee or commit another crime. This decision is
naturally modeled as a prediction problem.
3For the user study checking O(E), we do not show users the
internals ofB, so their decision of whether to trustB is not affected
by the fact that B happens to be interpretable.
Figure 2: Top 5 prohibited (left) and desired features (right),
and number of participants who voted for each one.
We use a dataset on bail outcomes collected from sev-
eral state courts in the U.S. between 1990-2009 (Lakkaraju
et al. 2019). This dataset contains 37 features, including de-
mographic attributes (age, gender, race), personal (e.g., mar-
ried) and socio-economic information (e.g., pays rent, lives
with children), current offense details (e.g., is felony), and
past criminal records of about 32K defendants who were re-
leased on bail. Each defendant in the data is labeled either as
risky (if he/she either fled and/or committed a new crime af-
ter being released on bail) or non-risky. The goal is to train a
black box that predicts these outcomes to help judges make
bail decisions. Explanations of this black box are needed to
help domain experts determine whether to trust the black
box.
Domain experts in user study. We carried out our study
with 47 subjects. Each participant is a student enrolled in
a law school at the time of our study. Each participant ac-
knowledged having in-depth knowledge (16 participants) or
at least some familiarity (31 participants) with the bail de-
cision making process. Of the subjects, 27 self-identified as
male and 20 as females; 25 are White, 15 Asian, 2 Hispanic,
and 5 African American.
We split our study into two phases: (i) First, we reached
out to each of the participants to determine which of the
features in the bail dataset are relevant (i.e., desired) and
which ones should be omitted (i.e., prohibited). We used
these insights to construct our classifier and its explanations
(see Section 5.1). (ii) Next, we performed the key part of
our study—we reached out to all the subjects to understand
how/why a particular explanation influences their trust of the
black box classifier.
5.1 Constructing the Black Box and Explanations
We discuss how we construct our black box (designed to be
untrustworthy) and its explanations (some of which are de-
signed to be misleading). We surveyed the domain experts to
identify desired and prohibited features, and then used this
information to construct our classifier and explanations. We
generate an untrustworthy black box B by explicitly includ-
ing prohibited features and omitting desired features, and
generate misleading explanations forB by explicitly includ-
ing desired features and/or omitting prohibited features.
Identifying prohibited and desired features. We surveyed
all our 47 subjects to identify prohibited and desired fea-
tures. Each participant is shown all 37 features in the bail
dataset, and is asked to indicate which ones are relevant and
which ones should be omitted when predicting if a defen-
dant is risky and should not be released on bail. Figure 2
shows the 5 features (x-axis) ranked as the most prohibited
(left) and the most desired (right) ones by the participants.
It also shows how many participants voted for each feature
(y-axis). Race and gender stand out unanimously as the top
prohibited features; prior jail incarcerations (PJI) and prior
failure to appear (PFTA) 4 are the top desired features. In
both cases, the first two features received significantly more
votes compared to all the other features, so we use race and
gender as prohibited features, and use PJI and PFTA as de-
sired features in all subsequent experiments.
Black box and explanations. We use the identified prohib-
ited and desired features to construct our black box and its
explanations. At a high level, our approach is to construct
a black box that is designed to be untrustworthy to the do-
main experts should they be familiar with its inner workings,
and construct high-fidelity explanations of this black box de-
signed to mislead them into trusting the black box.
To this end, we randomly shuffle the bail dataset and split
it into train (70%), test (25%), and validation (5%) sets. We
employ our framework with different parameter settings to
construct both the black box and its explanations. We lever-
age the validation set and a coordinate descent style tuning
procedure similar to that of MUSE to set the hyperparame-
ters λ1, λ2, ..., λ6 (Lakkaraju et al. 2019).
We first construct a black boxB that uses race and gender
(prohibited) and does not use PJI and PFTA (desired); thus,
B is most likely untrustworthy to the domain experts should
they examine its internal workings. We use our framework
to build B; while designed to construct explanations, it can
be applied to build an interpretable classifier by replacing
the black box labels B(x) (for each x ∈ X ) with the corre-
sponding ground truth label y. We use desired features D =
{PJI,PFTA} and prohibited features P = {race, gender}.
The resulting black box B, shown in Figure 1 (left), is an in-
terpretable two-level decision set; its accuracy on the held-
out test set is 83.28%.
We then use our framework to construct three different
high-fidelity explanations E1, E2, E3 of B, as follows: (i)
E1 does not use either prohibited features or desired features
(i.e., we use P = {race, gender,PJI,PFTA} and D = ∅),
(ii) E2 uses both prohibited and desired features (i.e., we
use P = ∅ andD = {race, gender,PJI,PFTA}, and (iii) E3
uses desired features but not prohibited features (i.e., we use
P = {race, gender} and D = {PJI,PFTA}. We show E3 in
Figure 1 (right);
A potential concern is that our goal is to study how quali-
titative aspects of each explanation (e.g., which features ap-
pear) affects whether a user trustsB; however, the fidelity of
an explanation can also affect user trust. Thus, it is impor-
tant to control for fidelity beforehand. To this end, we esti-
mate the fidelity of each explanation on the held-out test set;
the fidelities for E1, E2, E3 are 97.3%, 98.9%, and 98.2%
respectively. These values are all very similar; thus, differ-
ences in whether the user trusts or mistrusts B must be due
4If a defendant has failed to appear in the past, that means they
failed to show up for court dates and is deemed a flight risk.
Figure 3: Effect of various explanations on user trust of
black box B.
to the structure of the explanations rather than their fidelities.
5.2 Human Evaluation of Trust in Black Box
Next, we performed a user study with the domain experts to
understand how our different explanations E1, E2, E3 affect
user trust of the same black box model B.
User study design. We designed an online user study in
which 41 of the 47 domain experts that we recruited partici-
pated. 5 Each participant was randomly chosen to be shown
either the black box B (with fidelity 100%) or one of the ex-
planations E1, E2, E3 (with their corresponding fidelities).
Including the black box B is critical since it allows us to
estimate the baseline trust O∗(B)—i.e., whether users trust
B if they understand its internals. Each participant was in-
structed beforehand that the explanations they see are only
correlational, not causal. Participants were allowed to take
as much time as they wanted to complete the study.
Each participant was asked (i) to answer the following
yes/no question: “Below is an explanation generated by
state-of-the-art ML for a particular black box designed to
assist judges in bail decisions. Based on this explanation,
would you trust the underlying model enough to deploy it?”,
and (ii) a follow-up descriptive question to explain why they
decided to trust or mistrust the black box.
Results and discussion. Figure 3 shows the results of our
user study. Each of the bars corresponds to either the black
box or one of the explanations (x-axis). We show the corre-
sponding user trust, measured as the fraction of participants
who responded that they trust the underlying black box—
i.e., answered yes to the question above (y-axis).
As can be seen, only 9.1% of the participants who saw the
actual black box trusted it (blue), establishing our baseline
that the black box is not trustworthy. Next, we discuss users
who only saw one of the explanations of the black box. First,
only 10% of the participants who sawE2 (brown), which in-
cludes race and gender as well as PJI and PFTA, trusted the
underlying black box. On the other hand, 70% and 88% of
participants who saw E1 (yellow) and E3 (purple), respec-
tively, trusted the underlying black box. The prohibited fea-
5Remaining 6 participants were used to explore how interactive
explanations can affect user trust.
tures race and gender do not appear inE1 orE3; in addition,
E3 includes the desired features PJI and PFTA.
These results show thatE1 andE3 are misleading users—
i.e., they lead the user to trust a black box, while users find
the actual black box untrustworthy. Since B and E2 both in-
clude race and gender, participants are unwilling to trust the
black box in these two cases. On the other hand, race and
gender do not appear in E1 and E3, and in these cases users
are very likely to trust the underlying black box. These re-
sults are in spite of the clear warning we show to participants
saying that the explanations shown are not causal. Further-
more, participants who see E3 appear to trust the underly-
ing black box more frequently than those who see E1, most
likely since the desired attributes PJI and PFTA are used by
E3.
Finally, we analyzed the reasons participants gave for
their responses. They are consistent with our findings—i.e.,
user trust appears to primarily be driven by whether the race
and gender features appear in the explanation shown.
6 Discussion & Conclusions
We carried out the first systematic study of if and how ex-
planations of black boxes can mislead users and affect user
trust, including a novel theoretical framework for under-
standing when misleading explanations can exist, a novel
approach for generating explanations that are likely to be
misleading, and an extensive user study with domain experts
from law and criminal justice to understand how mislead-
ing explanations impact user trust. We find that user trust
can be manipulated by high-fidelity, misleading explana-
tions. These misleading explanations exist since prohibited
features (e.g., race or gender) can be reconstructed based
on correlated features (e.g., zip code). Thus, adversarial ac-
tors can fool end users into trusting an untrustworthy black
box—e.g., one that employs prohibited attributes to make
decisions. We consider two ways to address this challenge.
First, recent research (Lakkaraju et al. 2019) has advo-
cated for thinking about explanations as an interactive di-
alogue where end users can query or explore different ex-
planations (called perspectives) of the black box. In fact,
MUSE is designed for interactivity—e.g., a judge can ask
MUSE “How does the black box make predictions for de-
fendants of different races and/or genders?”, and it would
return an explanation that only uses race and/or gender on
outer if-then clauses. We performed another user study with
6 domain experts from our participant pool to study their
trust in the underlying black box B when they could explore
various explanations of B using MUSE, and found that only
16.7% of the participants (1 out of 6) trusted B. This value
is much closer to the baseline trust (9.1%).
Second, there has been recent work on capturing causal
relationships between input features and black box predic-
tions (Zhao and Hastie 2019; Wachter, Mittelstadt, and Rus-
sell 2017). Explanations relying on correlations not only
may be misleading (Rudin 2019), but have also been shown
to lack robustness (Ghorbani, Abid, and Zou 2019), and
causal explanations may address these issues.
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A Algorithm
A.1 Interpretability Measures
We describe how each of our interpretability objectives are
measured given a two-level decision set R (with M rules),
a black box B, and a training set D = {x1, ..., xN} ⊆ X .
These measures are summarized in Table 2.
The first four measures are structural properties of R.
First, we want to minimize the size of R, which is the num-
ber of triples (q, s, c) inR. Second, we want to minimize the
maximum width ofR, which is the maximum over (q, s, c) in
R of the quantities width(s) and width(q), where the width
of an if-then rule is the number of predicates that occur in
its condition. Third, we want to minimize the total number
of predicates in R, which is the sum over (q, s, c) in R of
width(s)+width(q). Fourth, we want to minimize the num-
ber of decision sets in R, which is the number of unique
neighborhood descriptors q inR.
The next measures are are semantic properties of R. In-
tuitively, this objective captures the idea that outer if-then
clauses (i.e., neighborhood descriptors) and inner if-then
rules have different semantic meanings. To make the distinc-
tion more clear, the overlap between the features that appear
in outer and inner if-then rules should be minimized. In par-
ticular, for each pair (q, s) of outer and inner if-then rules,
we sum up the number of features that occur in both q and
s; we want to minimize this quantity.
The final measure captures a property specific to decision
sets. For decision sets, multiple rules may apply for a given
example x ∈ X ; 6 i.e., rules can be ambiguous. To maximize
interpretability, for most examples x, the rules should be
unambiguous—i.e., only one rule should apply for a given
x. First, we want to minimize the rule overlap, which is the
number of extra rules that apply. Second, we want to max-
imize cover, which counts the number of instances in the
dataset that satisfy some rule inR.
Finally, we have
f1(R) = 2Wmax · |ND| · |DL| − numpreds(R)
f2(R) =Wmax · |ND| · |DL| − featureoverlap(R)
f3(R) = N(|ND| · |DL|)2 − ruleoverlap(R)
f4(R) = cover(R)
f5(R) = N · |ND| · |DL| − disagreement(R)
where Wmax is the maximum width of any rule in either can-
didate sets. To ensure that the objective is non-negative, we
have subtracted each measure from its upper bound.
B Proofs of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Consider input features XD =
XP = R, and there are no ambivalent features, so X =
XD×XP = R2, and binary labels Y = {0, 1}. Furthermore,
consider a distribution p((x1, x2), y) over X ×Y defined by
p((x1, x2), y) = p0(x1) · δ(x2 − x1) · δ(y − I[x2 ≥ 0]),
where p0 = N (0, 1). In other words, x1 is a standard Gaus-
sian random variable, x1 and x2 are perfectly correlated, and
6A rule applies to x if x satisfies its condition.
Table 1: Summary of notation.
Symbol Description
D DatasetD = {x1, x2, ..., xN}
ND Candidate set of conjunctions of predictions for choosing
outer if-then clauses of explanations
DL Candidate set of conjunctions of predictions for choosing
inner if-then rules of explanations
Table 2: Metrics used in the optimization problem.
fidelity disagreement(R) =
M∑
i=1
|{x ∈ D | x satisfies qi ∧ si, B(x) 6= ci}|
interpretability
size(R) = number of triples (q, s, c) inR
maxwidth(R) = max
e∈
M⋃
i=1
(qi∪si)
width(e)
numpreds(R) =
M∑
i=1
width(si) + width(qi)
numdsets(R) = |dset(R)| where dset(R) =
M⋃
i=1
qi
featureoverlap(R) =
∑
q∈dset(R)
M∑
i=1
featureoverlap(q, si)
unambiguity
ruleoverlap(R) =
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1,j 6=i
overlap(qi ∧ si, qj ∧ sj)
cover(R) = |{x ∈ D | x satisfies qi ∧ si for some i ∈ {1 · · ·M}}|
the outcome is 1 if x2 ≥ 0 and 0 otherwise. Next, consider
a black box
B((x1, x2)) = I[x2 ≥ 0],
i.e., B achieves zero loss. Since B uses the prohibited fea-
ture x2, it is probably untrustworthy—i.e., Oˆ∗(B) = 0. Sim-
ilarly, consider an explanation
E((x1, x2)) = I[x1 ≥ 0].
Since this explanation uses the desired feature and not
the prohibited feature, it is acceptable; thus, it is probably
misleading—i.e., Oˆ(E) 6= Oˆ∗(B). Finally, note that
L(E,B)
= Ep((x1,x2))[`(E((x1, x2)), B((x1, x2))]
= Ep((x1,x2))[`(I[x1 ≥ 0], I[x2 ≥ 0])]
= Ep(x1)
[∫
`(I[x1 ≥ 0], I[x2 ≥ 0]) · δ(x2 − x1)dx2
]
= Ep(x1)[
∫
`(I[x2 ≥ 0], I[x2 ≥ 0])]
= 0.
Thus, E achieves perfect fidelity, as claimed.
Proof of Theorem 3.2. First, we have the following decom-
position of the relative error: for any F, F ′, F ′′ : X → Y ,
L(F, F ′) ≤ L(F, F ′′) + L(F ′′, F ′).
This result follows since for any y, y′, y′′ ∈ Y ,
`(y, y′) = I[y 6= y′]
= I[y 6= y′′ ∧ y′′ = y′] + I[y = y′′ ∧ y′′ 6= y′]
≤ I[y 6= y′′] + I[y′′ 6= y′]
= `(y, y′′) + `(y′′, y′),
so we have
L(F, F ′) = Ep(x)[`(F (x), F ′(x))]
≤ Ep(x)[`(F (x), F ′′(x)) + `(F ′′(x), F ′(x))]
= L(F, F ′′) + L(F ′′, F ′).
As a consequence, we have
L(E,B) ≤ L(E,B+) + L(B+, B)
= L(E,B+) + R.
Next, note that
L(E,B+) ≤ L(E′, B+) + L(B+, B)
= L(E+, B+) + L(B+, B) + A,
where the first line follows since by definition, E′ maxi-
mizes error relative to B+ over E ∈ E , and the second line
follows by the definition of A. Now, again by our decom-
position of relative error, we have
L(E+, B+) ≤ L(E+, B) + L(B,B+)
= L(E+, B) + R,
where the last line follows since relative error is symmetric.
Putting these three inequalities together, we have
L(E+, B) ≤ L(E,B) + 2R + A
≤ +,
where the second line follows by our assumption in the theo-
rem statement. Since E+ ∈ E+, by definition of Oˆ, we have
Oˆ(E+) = 1, as claimed. .
Proof of Theorem 4.1. If at least one term in a linear combi-
nation is non-normal (resp., non-monotone), then the entire
linear combination is non-normal (resp., non-monotone).
Given that the objective in (1) is already non-normal (resp.,
non-monotone), then it follows that the objective in (2) it
is likewise non-normal (resp., non-monotone). In particu-
lar, coverdesired computes how many of the desired fea-
tures D appear in R. By definition, this value cannot be
negative. Since the objective in (1) is non-negative and
coverdesired(R) is non-negative, so the objective in (2) is
also non-negative. The non-monotone property follows sim-
ilarly. Next, we did not add any new constraints to (2), and
the constraints in (1) are known to follow a matroid struc-
ture. Thus, (2) also has matroid constraints.
Finally, note that coverdesired denotes the number of de-
sired features that appear in R. This function clearly has di-
minishing returns—i.e., more desired attributes will be cov-
ered when we add a new rule to a smaller set of rules com-
pared to a larger set. Therefore, this function is submodular.
Since the objective in (1) is submodular and coverdesired is
submodular, it follows that the objective in (2) is also sub-
modular since a linear combination of submodular functions
is submodular.
